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Abstract. We consider the privacy-preserving computation of node in-
fluence in distributed social networks, as measured by egocentric be-
tweenness centrality (EBC). Motivated by modern communication net-
works spanning multiple providers,
we show for the first time how multiple mutually-distrusting parties can
successfully compute node EBC while revealing only differentially-private
information about their internal network connections. A theoretical util-
ity analysis upper bounds a primary source of private EBC error—private
release of ego networks—with high probability. Empirical results demon-
strate practical applicability with a low 1.07 relative error achievable
at strong privacy budget  = 0.1 on a Facebook graph, and insignifi-
cant performance degradation as the number of network provider parties
grows.
Keywords: Differential privacy · Multi-party computation · Between-
ness centrality
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the measurement of node importance in communication net-
works with egocentric betweenness centrality (EBC) [7], representing how much
a node’s neighbours depend on the node for inter-connection. EBC has emerged
as a popular centrality measure that is used widely in practice [12].
EBC computation has many applications. In conjunction with methods for
identifying fake news [11,15], EBC can be used to limit its propagation by tar-
geting interventions at those individuals who are most critical in spreading infor-
mation. EBC computation is straightforward when all communication network
information is available to one trusted party. However in reality modern telecom-
munications involve competing network providers, even within the one country.
While many people communicate between countries with completely different
networks, where no central authority that can view all their connections. While
recent work [18] considered the case of two mutually-distrusting networks, mul-
tiple networks are essential for understanding one person’s communication and
presents non-trivial technical challenges.
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Here we present a protocol that preserves the privacy of the internal connec-
tions of each of arbitrarily-many networks while they collaborate on the com-
putation of EBC. By carefully structuring information flow, we achieve highly
accurate results and strong privacy protection. We produce a private output
that can be safely published. We assume the complete list of nodes (i.e., people)
is public, while individual connections are private. Each service provider knows
the connections within its own network, plus the connections between one of
its members and the outside (e.g., from when they contact someone in a differ-
ent network). Connections internal to other networks are unknown. We prove
that our protocol preserves edge differential privacy [8] in which the existence
or non-existence of an edge must be protected. We present:
1. A protocol for multi-party private EBC computation;
2. A strengthened adversarial model in comparison to prior work—all
participating networks are protected by edge-DP, even when the final output
is published;
3. A high-probability utility bound on a core component of our protocol: private
distributed release of ego networks;
4. Comprehensive empirical validation on open Facebook, Enron and PGP
datasets. This demonstrates applicability of our algorithm with modest 1.07
relative error at strong  = 0.1 DP, practical runtimes, and insignificant
degradation with increasingly many parties.
Near-constant accuracy with increasing numbers of parties is both surprising
and significant, as is our innovation over past work [18] by preventing leakage
at final EBC release. Our protocol is substantially more efficient than a na¨ıve
extension of two-party techniques, which would require total communication of
O(|V |2|A|2) where V is the set of vertices and A the parties. We achieve total
communication of O((|A| + |V |)|A||V |). All participants are equal—there is no
centralisation; and all parties are protected by edge DP. While we reuse the [18]
subset release two-stage sampler, we offer new analysis. We prove in Proposi-
tion 1 that it can be distributed without privacy/accuracy loss, and establish a
new high-probability utility bound on EBC based on this mechanism’s release
(Theorem 2).
2 Related Work
In most prior work on differentially-private graph processing, the computation
is performed by a trusted authority with complete knowledge of the whole net-
work. Only the output, not the intermediate computations, must preserve pri-
vacy [8,1,9,20,3,16,19,10,17]. There is considerable work on distributed differ-
ential privacy [4,2,14], where queries are distributed or decomposed into sub-
queries. However there is far less work in our distributed privacy model, in
which even the intermediate communication should preserve differential pri-
vacy. This privacy model is mostly related to distributed graphs where parties
seek joint computation of statistics of the graph. The most closely related work
Assessing Centrality Without Knowing Connections 3
is [18], which derives an edge-DP algorithm for EBC, but only for two net-
works. The algorithm allows two mutually-distrusting parties to jointly compute
the EBC privately using the exponential and Laplace mechanisms to maintain
differentially-private intermediate computations and communications. However
their work assumes the first party acts as a centraliser that does not share the
final result. It is thus not directly applicable to our setting.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Egocentric Betweenness Centrality
Proposed by [6] as a way of measuring a node’s importance by looking only at
its ego network, the set of nodes directly connected to it. To compute the EBC
of node a, we count, for each pair of a-neighbouring nodes (i, j), what fraction
of shortest paths between them pass through a. Since we consider only paths
within a’s ego network, only paths of length two are relevant. We count zero for
any pair (i, j) that is directly connected, because these two nodes do not rely on
a at all.
Definition 1 ([6]). Egocentric betweenness centrality of node a in simple undi-
rected graph (V,E) is defined as
EBC(a) =
∑
i,j∈Na:Aij=0,j>i
1
A2ij
,
where Na = {v ∈ V | {v, a} ∈ E} denotes the neighbourhood or ego network of
a, A denotes the (|Na|+1)×(|Na|+1) adjacency matrix induced by Na∪{a} with
Aij = 1 if {i, j} ∈ E and 0 otherwise; A2ij denotes the ij-th entry of the matrix
square, guaranteed positive for all i, j ∈ Na since all such nodes are connected
through a.
3.2 Differential Privacy on Graphs
We wish to protect the privacy of connections in networks, which are the edges
in the network graph. Differential privacy (DP) [5] limits the differences in an
algorithm’s output distribution on neighbouring databases, thus quantifying the
information leakage about the presence or absence of a particular record. We
use edge privacy [8], because we wish to control the attacker’s ability to make
inferences about the presence of individual edges. As graphs on identical node
sets, two databases are neighbours if they differ by exactly one edge.
Our databases are simply adjacency matrices in which an element Aij is 1
if there is an edge from i to j and zero otherwise. Equivalently, these can be
considered as sequences of bits: elements of {0, 1}n (where n is the number of
nodes in the network choose two). Formally, two databases D,D′ ∈ {0, 1}n are
termed neighbouring (denoted D ∼ D′) if there exists exactly one i ∈ [n] such
that Di 6= D′i and Dj = D′j for all j ∈ [n]\{i}. In other words, ‖D −D′‖1 = 1.
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Definition 2. For  > 0, a randomised algorithm on databases or mechanism
A is said to preserve -differential privacy if for any two neighbouring databases
D,D′, and for any measurable set R ⊆ Range(A),
Pr (A(D) ∈ R) ≤ exp() · Pr (A(D′) ∈ R) .
In this paper, we employ several generic mechanisms from the differential
privacy literature including Laplace [5] for releasing numeric vectors, and the
exponential [13] for private optimisation. We also use a recent subset release
mechanism [18] which leverages the exponential mechanism, and develop its
theoretical utility analysis.
Lemma 1 ([18]). Consider a publicly-known set V and a privacy-sensitive sub-
set R? ⊆ V . The exponential mechanism run with quality function q(R?, R) =
|R ∩ R?| + |R ∪R?| and ∆q = 1 preserves -DP. Algorithm 4 (see Appendix)
implements this mechanism, running in O(|V |) space and time.
4 Problem Statement
We have |A| participating parties A = {α1, . . . , α|A|}, each representing a
telecommunications service provider. They control a global communication graph
(V,E) whose nodes are partitioned into |A| (disjoint) sets one per service provider
s.t. Vα contains the nodes of party α. Every customer is represented as a node
that belongs to one and only one service provider; pairs of customers who have
had some communication (e.g., a phone call, SMS or email) are edges.
We will often equivalently represent edge sets as adjacency matrices (or flat-
tened vectors) with elements in {0, 1}.
We write Eα,α for the set of edges in (V,E) between nodes in Vα—these
are communications that happened entirely within α. Similarly, Eα,β are the
edges with one node in Vα and the other in Vβ—these represent communications
between two service providers. Set E =
⋃
α,β∈AEα,β is the disjoint union of all
such edge sets.
We assume that all nodes are known to all parties, but that each party learns
only about the edges that are incident to a node in its network, including edges
within its network.
We wish to enable all parties to learn and publicly release the EBC of any
chosen node a, while maintaining edge privacy between all parties. Without
loss of generality we assume a ∈ Vα1 . We also denote by V − = V \{a}. Before
detailing a protocol for accomplishing this task, we must be precise about a
privacy model.
Problem 1 (Private Multi-Party EBC). Consider a simple undirected graph
(
⋃
α∈A Vα,
⋃
α,β∈AEα,β) partitioned by parties A = {α1, . . . , α|A|} as above,
and an arbitrary node a ∈ Vα1 . The problem of private multi-party egocentric
betweenness centrality is for the parties α to collaboratively approximate EBC(a)
under assumptions that:
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A1. All parties α ∈ A know the entire node set ⋃α∈A Vα;
A2. Each party α ∈ A knows every edge incident to nodes within its own net-
work, i.e.
⋃
β∈AEα,β .
A3. The computed approximate EBC(a) needs to be available to all of parties.
The intermediate computation must protect -differential edge privacy of
each party from the others. We seek solutions under a fully adversarial privacy
model: irrespective of whether other parties follow the protocol, the releases by
party α protect its edge differential privacy. (Of course a cheating participant
can always release information about edges it already knows, which may join
another network.)
Furthermore, the output must protect -differential privacy of the edges. In
[18] the final EBC could be revealed only to the party who made the query. In
this paper, the final EBC is -differentially private and can be released safely to
anyone.
5 Multi-Party Private EBC
We describe three algorithms: SubsetRelease, PrivatePathCount, and
PrivateReciprocateandSum, which are privacy-preserving versions of Steps i–
iii of Protocol 3 (See Appendix). These then combine to produce PrivateEBC,
a differentially-private version of the whole protocol.
5.1 Private Ego Network Broadcast
Each party α runs SubsetRelease, Algorithm 4 (see Appendix) with its share
R?α of a’s ego network. It broadcasts the output Rα—the
approximation of R?α.
SubsetRelease uses the exponential mechanism to privately optimise a
particular quality function (Lemma 1) that encourages a large intersection be-
tween R?α and release Rα, along with a minimal symmetric set difference. As
each party runs this mechanism relative to its own node set, it operates its own
quality function defined relative to R?α (see Proposition 1 for the formal defi-
nition). We observe a convenient property of the quality functions run by each
party: they sum up to the overall quality function if the ego party was to run
SubsetRelease in totality. This permits proof (see the proof of proposition 1
in C) that this simple distributed protocol for private ego network approximation
exactly implements a centralised approximation. There is no loss to privacy
or accuracy due to decentralisation.
Proposition 1. Consider parties α ∈ A running SubsetRelease with identi-
cal budgets 1 > 0 and quality functions qα(R) = |R ∩R? ∩ Vα|+ |R ∪R? ∩ Vα|,
on their disjoint shares R?α = R
? ∩ Vα to produce disjoint private responses
Rα ⊆ Vα. Then R = ∪α∈ARα is distributed as SubsetRelease run with ,
quality function q(·), on the combined R? in V . Consequently the individual Rα
and the combined R, each preserve 1-DP simultaneously.
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Algorithm 1 PrivatePathCount
Input: ego node a ∈ Vα1 (remember, by assumption, α1 contains a); execution party
α ∈ A; true node set R?α; for each β ∈ A, edge set Eα,β and private node set Rβ ;
2,∆2 > 0
Ensure: A vector of noisy counts, indexed by endpoints {i, j} with i < j, of the total
number of nodes k in R?α that are connected to both i and j.
1: if α = α1 then
2: R?α ←− R?α ∪ {a}
3: end if
4: RA ←− ⋃β∈ARβ
5: for i ∈ RA do
6: for j ∈ RA with i < j do
7: K ←−
{
k ∈ R?α | {i, k}, {k, j} ∈
⋃
β∈AEα,β
}
8: T ijα ←− |K|+ Lap(2∆2/2)
9: end for
10: end for
11: return Tα
5.2 Private Path Count
Each party α runs Algorithm 1, using the Rβ ’s received from each other party
in the previous step. Party α counts all the 2-paths where the intermediate node
is in Rα. For each node pair (i, j) with i < j, α will send the 2-path count T
i,j
α to
the party that contains node i, just like the non-private version of the protocol.
But first, in order to privatise this vector of counts, Laplace noise is added to
the two-path counts according to the sensitivity in the following lemma proved
in Appendix D, thereby preserving 2-DP in this stage’s release.
Lemma 2. Let query f denote the vector-valued non-private response Tα of
party α in Algorithm 1. The L1-global sensitivity of f is upper-bounded by ∆f =
2|RA|.
5.3 Private Reciprocate and Sum
Every party α receives noisy counts from PrivatePathCount and for any
pairs i < j where i ∈ R?α and j ∈
⋃
β>αRβ ∪ R?α, that are believed by α to be
disconnected, α increments the received T i,j by the number of incident 2-paths.
Each party then reciprocates the summation of the counts. In this algorithm,
each party may replace noisy Rα with true R
?
α. This optimises utility at no cost
to privacy: counts T ij for i, j ∈ Rα\R?α are discarded. This is safe to do, since
the Laplace mechanism already accounts for changes in R?α. The Laplace noise is
utilised to privatise the reciprocated sum Sα to 3-DP, calibrated by sensitivity
as bounded next, with proof can be found in Appendix E.
Lemma 3. Let query f ′ denote the reciprocate and sum over 2-paths with in-
termediate point in
⋃
β Rβ while the nodes i < j are not connected and i ∈ R?α
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Algorithm 2 PrivateReciprocateandSum
Input: ego node a ∈ Vα1 ; execution party α ∈ A; for each α ≤ β ∈ A, edge set Eα,β
and private node set Rβ ; for each β ∈ A, noisy counts Tβ ; 3,∆3 > 0
1: R←− ⋃β>αRβ ∪R?α
2: Eα ←− ⋃β≥αEα,β
3: Sα ←− 0
4: for i ∈ R?α do
5: for j ∈ R with i < j do
6: if {i, j} /∈ Eα then
7: T ←−∑γ∈A T ijγ
8: Sα ←− Sα + (bmax{0, T}c+ 1)−1
9: end if
10: end for
11: end for
12: Sα ←− Sα + Lap(2∆3/3)
13: return Sα
and j ∈ ⋃β<αRβ ∪R?α. Then the L1-global sensitivity of f ′ is upper-bounded by
∆f ′ = (bmax{0, T}c+ 1)−1 ≤ 1 irrespective of party.
Communication complexity Ego Network Broadcast requires each party to send
to each other party |V | bits of length 1 that shows the node is present or not,
hence a total of O(|A|2|V |). Private Path Count sends, for each node i, up to
|V | messages T i,j from each party to the owner of node i. The pathcounts T ij
are at most |V |, so the total size is O(|A||V |2). Finally, Reciprocate and Sum
requires every participant to send each other one message: O(|A|2). Hence the
total communication complexity is O((|A|+ |V |)|A||V |).
5.4 PrivateEBC: Putting it All Together
After the parties have run the protocol phases, namely SubsetRelease, Pri-
vatePathCount and PrivateReciprocateandSum, they must finally com-
plete the computation of the private EBC. Algorithm 3 depicts PrivateEBC
orchestrating the high-level protocol thus far, and then adding the received Sα
to compute final EBC.
Theorem 1. PrivateEBC preserves (1 + 2 + 3)-DP for each party.
Remark 1. While we have used uniform privacy budgets across parties, our anal-
ysis immediately extends to custom party budgets.
6 Utility Bound
In this section we develop a utility analysis of privacy-preserving betweenness
centrality, noting that no previous theoretical analysis has been performed in-
cluding in the two-party case [18]. Our analysis focuses on a utility bound on
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Algorithm 3 PrivateEBC
Input: (Public) ego node a ∈ Vα1 ; ordered set of parties A; node sets Vα for α ∈ A;
parameter vectors ,∆  0.
Input: (Private) for each α, β ∈ A, edges Eα,β , nodes R?α;
1: for α ∈ A in parallel do
2: Party α does:
3: if α = α1 then
4: V = Vα\{a}
5: else
6: V = Vα
7: end if
8: Rα ← SubsetRelease(V,R?α, 1)
9: Broadcast Rα
10: Tα ← PrivatePathCount(α,Eαβ , Rβ , 2,∆2)
11: for all i, j ∈ V with i < j do
12: Send T i,jα to the Party β s.t. i ∈ Vβ
13: end for
14: Sα ← ReciprocateandSum(a, {Eα,β , Rβ |β > α}, 3). {Party α reciprocates
and sums only paths with β ≥ α.}
15: Broadcast Sα
16: pEBC(a)←∑α∈A Sα
17: Return pEBC(a)
18: end for
EBC resulting from the subset release mechanism run to privatise the ego net-
work. We abuse notation with q(R) = q(R?, R) referring to the quality function
of the SubsetRelease mechanism of Lemma 1 with dependence on the pri-
vate R? made implicit; likewise for the quality functions run by each party in
the decentralised setting. The technical challenge is in leveraging the following
well-known utility bound on the exponential mechanism, which only establishes
high-probability near-optimal quality.
Corollary 1. Consider parties α ∈ A each running SubsetRelease concur-
rently with budgets  > 0 and quality functions qα(R) = |R∩R?∩Vα|+ |R ∪R?∩
Vα| on their disjoint shares R?α = R?∩Vα to produce disjoint responses Rα ⊆ Vα.
Then the consequent high-probability quality bound of Lemma 4 (see Appendix)
holds for random combined response R = ∪αRα.
Our first step is to relate EBC error on a released R to the quality q(R).
We organise differences in EBC by reciprocal 2-path count terms, enumerating
shared and unshared such terms between private and non-private EBCs. As these
terms and their differences are bounded by one, the task reduces to measuring
differences in ego network cardinalities, Lemma 5 (see Appendix). Conveniently,
this is also the goal of our quality score function. We now use Lemma 5 with our
lifted exponential utility bound Proposition 1 to bound EBC error. The previous
lemma is agnostic to the number of parties—the released R might be produced
in its entirety by the ego node’s party through a single call to SubsetRelease,
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Fig. 1. Utility of Private EBC for Facebook, Enron and PGP data sets.
or it could be the disjoint union of multiple calls to SubsetRelease by each
party. Likewise our lifted bound on high-probability quality also holds as if R is
produced centrally. As such the proof—found in the Appendix—of the following
result may proceed as if this is the case.
We prove the following high-probability utility bound in the Appendix I.
Theorem 2. Consider privacy budget  > 0, true ego network R? and t >
|R?|2/2. And suppose that each party α ∈ A runs SubsetRelease with budget
, quality function qα(R) = |R ∩ R? ∩ Vα| + |R ∪R? ∩ Vα|, on their disjoint
share R?α = R
? ∩ Vα to produce disjoint private response Rα ⊆ Vα. Then EBC1
produced from R = ∪α∈ARα incurs error relative to non-private EBC run on
non-private R?, upper bounded as |EBC −EBC1| ≤ t, with probability at least:
1− exp (−(√2t− |R?|)/2) 2|V −| .
Remark 2. The bound of Theorem 2 can make meaningful predictions (i.e., is
non-vacuous). For example a modest privacy budget of 2.1 is sufficient to
guarantee reasonable relative error 3 w.h.p 0.999 for a large ego network
spanning half an (otherwise sparse) graph. Similar relative error (for end-to-end
private EBC) at similar privacy budgets occurs in experiments on real, non-
sparse networks below. Further analysis can be found in Appendix J.
7 Experimental Setup
In order to validate the utility and privacy of PrivateEBC, we experimented
with three different graphs on Facebook friendships with 63,731 nodes and
817,035 edges1, the Enron email network with 36,692 nodes and 183,831
1 Institute of Web Science and Technologies at the University of KoblenzLandau: The
Koblenz network collection (2018),
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Fig. 2. Timing results and effect of degree for Facebook, Enron and PGP data sets.
edges2and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) with 10,680 nodes and 24,316 edges1.
We employ uniform random sampling in order to partition the graphs into mul-
tiple disjoint parties while keeping the structure of the graph intact. In addition
to evaluations on three parties across datasets, we also validated utility across
2, 3, 5, 7 and 10 parties on the PGP data set. The experiments were run on
a server with 2 × 28 core Xeon’s (112 threads with hyper threading) and 1.5
TB RAM, using Python 3.7 without parallel computations. We employed the
Mpmath arbitrary precision library for implementing inverse transform sampling
(Algorithm 5 in the Appendix) and set the precision to 300 bits. We use rela-
tive error between true EBC and private EBC—the lower the relative error the
higher the utility. Any errors around 1 or 2 are considered practical as they sig-
nify EBCs within the same order of magnitude. We ran the experiment 60 times
for each chosen value  by choosing the target ego nodes randomly and robustly
aggregating the relative error by median. Throughout we set 1 = 2 = 3 = /3.
8 Results
First, we demonstrate how PrivateEBC utility varies with increasing privacy
budget from 0.1 to 7, for three parties across each of three different graph
2 Stanford University: Stanford large network dataset collection (2009)
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datasets. The median relative error between real and private EBC represents
utility. Figure 1(a) displays the results for Facebook, Enron and PGP data sets,
where median relative error decreases significantly when  is increased to a strong
guarantee of 1, and remains small for larger . For strong privacy guarantee of
 = 0.5, median relative error is usually ≈ 1 for all three data sets. These results
demonstrate that PrivateEBC achieves practical utility across a range
of graph sizes and privacy levels. Next we report utility at privacy  = 1
for the number parties ranging over 2, 3, 5, 7 and 10. Every point in Figure 1(b)
shows the median relative error between private and real EBC across 120 ran-
domly chosen nodes in the PGP data set. Our results find insignificant
degradation occurs to accuracy or privacy when growing the number
of parties.
Remark 3. While more parties means more calls to ReciprocateandSum and
PrivatePathCount such that the scale of the second and third mechanisms’
Laplace noise increases moderately, the major source of error, SubsetRelease,
is not affected by the number of parties as proved in Proposition 1.
We report on timing analysis for PrivateEBC as a function of privacy. Median
computation time of 60 random ego nodes for  budget from 0.1 to 7 is reported
in Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(d), on Facebook, Enron and PGP data sets. Here
total time overall decreases as privacy decreases (increasing ), while a small
increase to runtime can be seen at very high levels of privacy (low but increasing
) for Enron it is likely due to different behaviours in the protocol with increasing
. When the set difference of R and R? is small, the two-stage sampler generates
small numbers of nodes in faster time. However faster runtime with lower privacy
dominates behaviour overall.
Figures 2(d), 2(e), 2(f) show how the median relative error is changing by
ego node degree. We report results on privacy budget  = 1, which do not
show significant dependence: In Facebook the median relative error is almost
constant for different node degrees and in Enron and PGP for node degrees up
to 102, deviations are approximately 1% and 0.5% of the maximum relative error
respectively.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper develops a new protocol for multi-party computation of egocentric
betweeness centrality (EBC) under per-party edge differential privacy. We sig-
nificantly improve on past work by extending to multiple parties, achieving very
low communication complexity, theoretical utility analysis, the facility to release
the private EBC to all parties. Experimental results demonstrate the practical
accuracy and runtime of our protocol at strong levels of privacy.
For future work we hope to allocate differential privacy budgets per stage, by
optimising utility bounds. We also intend to develop a network model that re-
flects a person’s use of multiple media, so that the node set need not be disjointly
partitioned, while the privacy of edges remains paramount.
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Appendix
A Non-Private Multi-Party Protocol
We first show how different parties can compute EBC without preserving privacy,
but with special attention to efficiency (so as to improve on a na¨ıve application of
the two-party protocol of [18]). A party β that contains a node j can always count
the number of 2-step paths through j, but it doesn’t know which of the nodes
adjacent to j are in the ego-network of a (except in some special cases). So in
order for β to count the number of 2-paths in a’s ego network that pass through
j, we require each other party α to tell β which of its nodes are neighbours of
a. This is denoted by R?α.
Recall that Na denotes the ego network of a anywhere in the graph (not
including a since the graph has no self-loops). Figure 3 summarises the following
protocol.
Protocol 3 All parties execute in parallel, waiting until they have received all
messages from one step before commencing the next step. Party α proceeds as
follows:
i. [EgoNetwork] α broadcasts to every party the set R?α of neighbours of a
contained within α;
ii. [PathCount] For all nodes i, j ∈ ⋃β∈AR?β s.t. i < j, party α computes T i,jα ,
the number of 2-paths from i to j where the intermediate point k ∈ R?α
(irrespective of whether i, j are directly connected). It sends T i,jα to the party
βˆ for which i ∈ Vβˆ;
iii. [ReciprocateAndSum] For every i ∈ R?α and all j > i, α computes the total
number of 2-paths between i, j provided these nodes are disconnected: it sums
T i,jβ for all β ∈ A. It then sets Sα to be the reciprocal of this sum and
broadcasts this value to all parties;
iv. α completes the computation of EBC(a) as
∑
α∈A Sα.
Participants can easily tell when to move on to the next step. At the end of
Step ii, party α should have received T i,j
β˜
, from each other party β˜, for each node
i ∈ R∗α, and each j ∈ ∪β∈AR?β with j > i. By the end of Step iii it should have
received a broadcast value from all other parties.
B Privacy Disclosure
Now consider how the privacy of edges can be compromised in the first three
steps of Protocol 3.
i. When R?α is broadcast in Step i, other parties learn directly of all edges
incident to a in α.
ii. When T ijα is sent to βˆ in Step ii, it reveals information about edges outside βˆ.
A worst case occurs for node i when there is only one node k ∈ α connected
to it. Then T ijα reveals the existence of edge j, k for all j > i.
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Party α Party β Party γ
Ego network in α
Path count
Reciprocate and Sum
Fig. 3. EBC multi-party protocol for party α, comprising three messages per party.
Visualised for three parties.
iii. When α broadcasts Sα, it reveals the connection status of edges within α.
In the worst case when there is just two nodes i and j in α, an edge between
them can change Sα from a non zero value to zero.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Observe that since the Vα form a disjoint partition of V , that for any Rα ⊆ Vα
we have that ∑
α∈A
qα(Rα) = q
(⋃
α∈A
Rα
)
.
Combining this with the independence of the concurrent executions of Subse-
tRelease, we have that the joint density over their releases corresponds to
p(r) =
∏
α∈A
p(rα)
∝
∏
α∈A
exp (qα(rα) · 1)
= exp
(
1
∑
α∈A
qα(rα)
)
= exp (q(r) · 1) .
Due to uniqueness of probability density normalisation, this proves the result.
D Proof of Lemma 2
Algorithm PrivatePathCount is executed by all parties; the output of these
computations is broadcast to other parties. As we need to preserve the privacy
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of each party’s edges individually, we consider one (arbitrary) party α ∈ A. The
output of α is a vector of the counts of all 2-paths connecting i, j ∈ RA =⋃
β∈ARβ with intermediate node k ∈ R?α. Adding or removing an edge from
Eα =
⋃
β∈AEα,β , can worst-case change 2|RA| elements of α’s counts by one
each. To see this, consider a very highly-connected node k and the deletion of
{i, k} for any i: this reduces the counts for paths joining i, j for all j ∈ RA.
Likewise if i were also within party α and were highly connected then the edge
removal would also reduce counts for paths joining k, j for all j ∈ RA. This
proves that the sensitivity for part α running PrivatePathCount is 2|RA|
irrespective of party α.
E Proof of Lemma 3
Once again we apply post-processing to previously sanitized outputs Rβ , Tβ .
Consider any party α ∈ A and the effect of removing/adding an edge incident
to a node of α. At worst this will result in the condition {i, j} /∈ Eα of line 6
of Algorithm 2, evaluating differently—for at most one pair {i, j}. That is, the
non-private sum of reciprocals Sα can be affected by the addition/removal of a
single term (bmax{0, T}c+ 1)−1. Such a term is upper bounded by the reciprocal
of lower bound on bmax{0, T}c + 1 ≥ 1. That is, the sensitivity, irrespective of
executing party α, is 1.
F Lemma 4
Lemma 4 (Lemma 7 of [13]).
Consider a centralised party running SubsetRelease with budget  > 0,
quality function q(·) on R?. For t > 0 let St = {R : q(R) > q(R?)− t}, and
let µ be the uniform probability mass function on P(V −). Then Pr(S2t) ≤
exp(−t)µ(S2t)/µ(St).
G Lemma 5
Lemma 5. For any R ⊆ V − we may bound the additive EBC error from using
R instead of non-private R? according to the quality function applied to the
random release:
|EBC − EBC1| ≤ 1
2
(|V | − q(R) + |R?|)2
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G.1 Proof of Lemma 5
Let T ij , T ij1 denote the number of 2-paths connecting i, j within node-sets R
?
and R respectively. Our goal is to upper bound the quantity:∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j∈R?
1 [{i, j} ∈ E]
T ij
−
∑
i,j∈R
1 [{i, j} ∈ E]
T ij1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
i,j∈R?∩R
∣∣∣∣∣1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij − 1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij1
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
i∈R\R?,j∈R
∣∣∣∣∣1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij1
∣∣∣∣∣
+
∑
i∈R?\R,j∈R?
∣∣∣∣1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij
∣∣∣∣ ,
following from the triangle inequality and collection of terms with shared end-
point nodes i, j. By cases: only when both end points are elements of the inter-
section R ∩ R? is there a pair of matching EBC terms. Otherwise at least one
(or both) end-point nodes sit outside R or R? respectively—in which case there
is only one EBC term for the corresponding node set.
We can see that both types of summand are bounded above by unity. For in
the second case, for any i, j ∈ R?,∣∣∣∣1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 ,
since T ij ≥ 1 since there is always a path through egonode a. The same holds
for the case of i, j ∈ R by definition. And in the first case of i, j ∈ R ∩ R?, we
have that ∣∣∣∣∣1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij − 1 [{i, j} ∈ E]T ij1
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1− 1
max({|R?|, |R|})− 2
< 1 .
Therefore it follows that∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i,j∈R?
1 [{i, j} ∈ E]
T ij
−
∑
i,j∈R
1 [{i, j} ∈ E]
T ij1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |{i, j : i, j ∈ R ∩R?}|
+ |{i, j : i ∈ R\R?, j ∈ R}|
+ |{i, j : i ∈ R?\R, j ∈ R?}|
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=
(|R ∪R?|
2
)
− |R?\R||R\R?|
≤ |R ∪R?|2/2
≤ (|R\R?|+ |R?\R|+ |R?|)2 /2
= (|V | − q(R) + |R?|)2 /2 ,
where the first equality follows by enumerating the i, j pairs being counted as
all those within R or R? provided that both nodes do not reside in separate set
differences R\R? and R?\R.
This completes the result.
H Proof of Corollary1
The claim follows from Lemma 4 combined with Proposition 1.
I Proof of Theorem 2
We begin by defining two events of interest on R ∈ P (V −) for any s > 0 to be
chosen later: Ss that our (centralised by Proposition 1) exponential mechanism
achieves near-optimality, and Ts that the resulting EBC is near optimal. Rewrit-
ing the event Ss defined in Lemma 4, using q˜(R) = |V | − q(R) and q˜(R?) = 0,
we have that
Ss = {R : q˜(R) ≤ s} ,
which holds w.p. at least 1− exp(−s/2)2−|V −|. Next define
Ts =
{
R : |EBC − EBC1| ≤ 1
2
(s+ |R?|)2
}
.
By Lemma 5 we have that |EBC−EBC1| ≤ 12 (q˜(R)+|R?|)2. And since (a+b)2/2
is increasing in a ∈ R for b ≥ 0, event Ss implies then that |EBC − EBC1| ≤
1
2 (s + |R?|)2 and so Ss ⊆ Ts and Pr(Ts) ≥ Pr(Ss). Provided that t > |R?|2/2,
taking s =
√
2t− |R?| > 0 this completes the result.
J Analysis for Remark 2
Consider a very sparse graph on nodes |V | > 10, and consider a true ego network
R? with cardinality represented as a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of |V | i.e., |R?| = α|V |.
Let us now invoke the theorem with error bound t taken to be a multiplier γ > 1
of EBC—yielding a relative error bound of |EBC −EBC1|/EBC ≤ γ. For very
sparse graphs, EBC can arbitrarily approach
(|R?|
2
)
≤ |R?|2/2 for γ bounded
away from zero and large |V |. Thus setting t = γ|R?|2/2 corresponds to rela-
tive error γ which is meaningful for γ not much larger than 1 (corresponding
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to private EBC within the same order of magnitude as non-private EBC). Next
we wish to set the confidence 1 − δ to be very close to unity e.g., δ = 2−10
corresponds to confidence exceeding 99.9%. With these choices, we set the con-
fidence in Theorem 2 to 1 − δ and solve for the privacy budget required for
SubsetRelease:
 ≥ 3 loge 2
(γ − 1)α .
K Precise algorithms
We rephrase the forward-pass algorithm from [18] as a generic subset release
mechanism through Algorithms 4, 5 and 6.
Algorithm 4 SubsetRelease Two-Stage Sampler
Input: public set V , private subset R? ⊆ V ;  > 0
1: I ←− InverseTransformSampler(|V |, )
2: R←− PickAndFlipSampler(V,R?, I)
3: return R
Algorithm 5 InverseTransformSampler
Input: cardinality |V |;  > 0
// Compute log-space PDF of I
1: p0 ←− −|V | log
(
1 + exp
(

2
))
2: for i ∈ [|V |] do
3: pi ←− pi−1 + log(|V | − i+ 1)− log i
4: end for
5: ψ ←− −Exp(1)
6: c←− p0
7: for I ∈ [|V |] do
8: if c ≥ ψ then
9: return I − 1
10: end if
11: c←− log(exp(c) + exp(pI))
12: end for
13: return I
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Algorithm 6 PickAndFlipSampler
Input: public set V ; private subset R? ⊆ V ; I ∈ {0, . . . , |V |}
1: R←− R?
2: V1, . . . , V|V |−I ∼ Unif (V ) without replacement
3: for j ∈ [|V | − I] do
4: if Vj ∈ R then
5: R←− R\{Vj}
6: else
7: R←− R ∪ {Vj}
8: end if
9: end for
10: return R
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